adam zivo: vladimir putin is a warmonger. why is anyone surprised?
russia resisting a ceasefire shows it is the true obstacle to peace, not ukraine
5 minute read
russia's president vladimir putin speaks during a press conference following a meeting with his belarusian counterpart at the kremlin in moscow on march 13, 2025. (photo by maxim shemetov / pool / afp)
ukraine’s newly-announced openness to a 30-day ceasefire with russia, along with the united states’ immediate resumption of military and intelligence support for kyiv, is undoubtedly a victory for the west. not only has ukraine proven to its allies that it is serious about ending the war, russia’s resistance to a reasonable truce underlines, yet again, its status as a predatory aggressor.
the ceasefire deal was negotiated during a day of u.s.-ukraine talks in saudi arabia on tuesday, and was meant to segue into a longer-term settlement, details of which have not been made public. however, russia rejected the current iteration of the deal on thursday, with kremlin aid yuri ushakov dismissing it as “nothing other than a temporary respite for the ukrainian military, nothing more.”
in a news conference, russian president vladimir putin said that the deal “needs more detailed work,” that it should address the “root causes” of the conflict, which he did not define, and that ukraine should not train troops or receive military aid during the ceasefire period.
sources told the economist that ukrainian officials initially put forward a partial ceasefire, covering only the air and sea, along with a prisoner exchange and the return of ukrainian children who’d been kidnapped by russian forces at the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
advertisement
when the american delegation counter-proposed a complete (but temporary) ceasefire, ukrainian president volodymyr zelenskyy is reported to have quickly given his approval over the phone, after which point negotiations swiftly shifted in kyiv’s favour, leading to the resumption of american intelligence and military support.
both sides reaffirmed their commitment to signing a deal allowing for the joint development of ukraine’s mineral resources. this deal was originally supposed to have been signed last month, during zelenskyy’s visit to the white house, but was paused after trump and u.s. vice president jd vance publicly belittled and shouted at the ukrainian president in the oval office.
the sources cited by the economist further alleged that tuesday’s negotiations were buoyed by the unexpected absence of steve witkoff, a pugnacious real-estate tycoon who, despite a total lack of diplomatic experience, has been tasked with brokering a ukrainian peace deal on behalf of u.s. president donald trump, with whom he is close personal friends.
international commentators have expressed concern about witkoff’s nepotistic diplomatic presence and the fact that witkoff apparently helped marginalize keith kellogg, trump’s official special envoy to ukraine. kellogg is relatively sympathetic to kyiv, and has apparently been sidelined from the peace process.
advertisement
witkoff’s absence from these talks reportedly allowed u.s. secretary of state marc rubio and national security adviser michael waltz to take charge of negotiations from the american side. both men are neoconservatives with a long history of being hawkish on russia, notwithstanding their recent embrace of maga talking points.
their successful negotiations with kyiv suggests that factionalism within the trump administration has had a significant, yet underappreciated, impact on american foreign policy.
after negotiations concluded, rubio publicly announced the ceasefire deal and stated that the “ball is in russia’s court now,” marking a shift in tone from washington, which previously insisted that the ukrainian government is the primary obstacle to a peace deal. trump subsequently expressed openness to inviting zelenskyy over for another white house visit, potentially mending relations after last month’s blow-out between the two men, and warned that russia could face devastating financial consequences if it stalls or rejects the ceasefire deal.
these signals and threats were evidently not enough to force russia into making reasonable compromises, though, which is rather unsurprising.
advertisement
it is generally believed that russia wants a ceasefire only toward the end of peace negotiations, partially so that moscow can press its military advantages and strengthen its negotiating position. from this perspective, quickly acceding to trump’s ceasefire deal arguably undermines russia’s foreign policy goals.
while ukrainian forces have stabilized the frontline in the donbas region, ending months of steady russian advances there, they are also on the cusp of fully retreating from western russia’s kursk oblast. kyiv unexpectedly seized 1,000 square kilometres within kursk last august, which it hoped to use as a bargaining chip, but moscow was able to slowly retake these lands with the help of north korean troops, culminating with russian vladimir putin’s victorious visit to the area this week.
even if kursk were not a factor, it is hard to imagine russia supporting a fair ceasefire, given that putin’s vision for “peace” involves unacceptable demands from ukraine. this includes further land concessions (russia claims sovereignty over large swathes of “annexed” territory it does not actually control), de facto regime change, crippling ukraine’s military and the prohibition of international peacekeepers to enforce an eventual peace settlement. notably, he has previously referred to some of these measures as solutions to the underlying causes of the current war.
advertisement
putin has made such demands for years, including in the now-infamous 2022 “istanbul communique,” which presented a so-called peace deal that amounted to ukraine’s de facto capitulation (aka: shrinking and disarming ukraine’s army, banning kyiv from securing any real defensive allies). russian officials reportedly reiterated these requirements to american officials in recent weeks, eliciting a divided response.
while witkoff believes that the 2022 istanbul negotiations could be useful for informing future peace talks (suggesting a bad peace that leaves ukraine vulnerable to future dismemberment), kellogg publicly stated last week that he did not see these negotiations as a starting point. were this brittle ceasefire used to strip ukraine of military aid, and freeze its efforts to build up its defences, that would align with the istanbul approach and play into russia’s long-term expansionism — let us not forget that, since 2014, putin has broken numerous ceasefires with ukraine, so his promises must be treated skeptically.
the trump administration now has a choice to make: it can give putin what he wants (the path seemingly preferred by witkoff), or it can firmly support a fair deal and demonstrate to the world that american power is principled and reliable. whatever path the americans choose, it should now be clear to any observer that the kremlin’s commitment to “peace” is hollow and that putin is little more than an unrepentant warmonger.
advertisement
national post
editor’s note: this column was updated after russia indicated it would possibly be open to a ceasefire under modified terms.
share story
