adam zivo: trump will fail to turn russia against china
why would russia risk encirclement between a hostile europe to the west and an alienated china to the southeast?
4 minute read
cp-web. file - traditional russian wooden dolls depicting china's president xi jinping, u.s. president-elect donald trump and russian president vladimir putin are displayed for sale at a souvenir shop in st. petersburg, russia, nov. 21, 2024. (ap photo/dmitri lovetsky, file)
some foreign policy analysts have theorized that the trump administration wants to form a russo-american alliance against china, echoing the nixon administration’s anti-soviet partnership with beijing in the 1970s. hopefully, this is not the case, because such an initiative would almost certainly fail, given the depth of contemporary sino-russian cooperation, and, even if successful, would ultimately undermine american interests.
at a meeting in brussels last month, u.s. defence secretary pete hegseth made it clear that the united states sees beijing as its primary adversary, and that the republicans will prioritize “deterring war with china in the pacific” over buttressing european security. around this time, vice president j.d. vance also decried russia’s newfound status as beijing’s “junior partner,” and said that it is “ridiculous” for washington “to push russia into the hands of the chinese.”
in light of these comments (and the general trajectory of american foreign policy), it appears that the white house prioritizes weakening the sino-russian alliance — but does that necessarily mean that it hopes to supplant beijing as moscow’s lead ally? neither trump nor his representatives have explicitly said so, but their fawning appeasement of russian president vladimir putin suggests it.
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washington’s rapprochement with russia has been so sudden, rapid, and, at times, borderline-obsequious that it is difficult to grasp its underlying rationale. the same goes for its eagerness to hollow out nato: why discard so many valuable partners, to moscow’s delight, without a planned substitute?
these moves may just be vulgar transactional politics, but it would be tempting to believe, especially for maga republicans, that the united states is actually playing chess here. what would it mean if the trump administration were quietly copying the playbook of henry kissinger, who helped former u.s. president richard nixon broker an unlikely alliance with maoist china against the soviet union?
if pulling off a “reverse kissinger” is indeed the long-term goal, then that is not a sign of strategic brilliance. the diplomatic successes of the 1970s simply cannot be recreated today, because they were only made possible by the deep loathing that the soviet union and china felt towards one another, which no longer exists.
the origins of this loathing can be traced back to 1956, when soviet leader nikita khrushchev denounced joseph stalin, who had died three years earlier, as a dictator and ordered the dismantlement of his cult of personality. unfortunately, mao zedong admired stalin’s strength and believed that khrushchev and his successors were “revisionists” who strayed from marxist orthodoxy. when hungary revolted against soviet rule that year, he saw this as confirmation that de-stalinization was destabilizing, and feared what might happen to him if similar reforms were to roil china.
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the soviets, meanwhile, considered mao a madman and were revolted when he announced, during a 1957 meeting, that he was “not afraid of nuclear war” because “china has a population of 600 million; even if half of them are killed, there are still 300 million people left.”
under the backdrop of these personal animosities, sino-soviet tensions quickly soured and technological, economic and military cooperation collapsed. by the late-1960s, the two countries were on the brink of war and, when border skirmishes erupted in 1969, the soviets even planned a large-scale preemptive nuclear strike against china, but backed down after the united states refused to support them and warned beijing.
so it was unsurprising that, in 1972, just three years after the soviets almost nuked his nation, mao was eager to partner with kissinger and nixon. however, according to several security and foreign policy experts i interviewed, there is no analogous animosity between china and russia today that could possibly motivate a similar pivot.
moscow and beijing are now firmly geostrategic and economic allies. both want to dismantle american hegemony by challenging u.s.-led global institutions and by diminishing use of the dollar as a global reserve currency. their economies are deeply integrated and complementary: russia predominantly exports weapons, oil and gas, which china needs and the united states does not (as american domestic supplies suffice). furthermore, beijing has provided substantial, covert military support to the kremlin in its war against ukraine.
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residual border disputes between the two countries were settled in the 2000s, and, despite some politics over place names, beijing has shown no significant desire to reconquer its long-lost imperial territories in siberia. china’s increased influence in central asia, which russia considers its backyard, has been provocative, but beijing and moscow have seemingly settled into a symbiotic relationship: russian security dominance co-exists with chinese economic might.
ali wyne, a senior u.s.-china policy specialist at the international crisis group, says that a new sino-soviet split is unlikely, partially because “personalities matter” in global affairs (as illustrated by the mao-khrushchev rift) and putin and chinese president xi jinping share a strong bond and “genuine affinity” for one another.
it is hard to imagine that russia would abandon its stable and fruitful partnership with china, after decades of investment, to build, from scratch, a new american alliance which could implode with the election of a new american president. why would russia risk encirclement between a hostile europe to the west and an alienated china to the southeast? and would such an alliance require washington to treat iran and north korea as friends, too?
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an anti-chinese russo-american alliance simply makes no sense. republican support for the idea is whimsical, and only risks undermining the united states’ credibility while nudging europe closer to china.
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adam zivo is an alumnus of the asian institute at the munk school of global affairs & public affairs. this analysis in this article was supported by interviews with ali wyne (senior research and advocacy advisor for u.s.-china at the international crisis group), carol saivetz (senior fellow in the mit security studies program), and sergey radchenko (wilson e. schmidt distinguished professor at the johns hopkins school of advanced international studies).
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